Sometime during the mid-1970s, at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, a major debate erupted around modernization the ory that crystallized a decade of social and intellec tual change. l\vo speakers were featured, Alex Inkeles and Immanuel Wallerstein. Inkeles reported that his studies of "modern man" (Inkeles/Smith 1974) had demonstrated that personality shifts to ward autonomy and achievement were crucial and predictable results of social modernization, which revolved most centrally around the industrializa tion of society. The response to Inkeles was appre ciative from many of the senior members of the au dience, skeptical from the younger. Wallerstein re sponded to Inkeles in a manner that pleased the younger generation more. "We do not live in a modernizing world but in a capitalist world," he proclaimed (1979: 133) , asserting that "what ma kes this world tick is not the need for achievement but the need for profit." When Wallerstein went on to lay out "an agenda of intellectual work for those who are seeking to understand the world systemic transition from capitalism to socialism in which we are living " (1979: 135, original italics) , he literally brought the younger members of the audience to their feet.2 2 As I remember the event, and it was certainly an ev ent, the entire audience became rather heated up. One leading leftist sociologist of development of fered the sarcastic intervention that modernization theory had actually produced world-wide poverty, and made the pointed suggestion that Inkeles try selling his tired modernization line somewhere else. At this point, shouts arose from various quarters of the audience and this distinguished social scientist had to be physically restrained from underscoring his theoretical point in a decidedly nonintellectual man ner. The article from which I am quoting, written by Wallerstein and published in a collection published by him in 1979, clearly was drawn from the A.S.A. talk referred to above, although my references to the talk are drawn from memory. Tlryakian (1991) places WaUerstein's article in a similar historical perspective Fifteen years later, the lead article in the Ameri can Sociological Review was entitled "A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Mar kets in State Socialism." The transition referred to in this article was rather different from the one Wallerstein had in mind. Written by Victor Nee, once inclined to Maoism and now a rational choice theorist specializing in China's burgeoning market economy, the article suggested that the only hope for organized socialism was capitalism. In fact, Nee portrayed socialism exactly as Marx had de picted capitalism, and provoked remarkably simi lar expectations. State socialism, he wrote, was an archaic, out-dated mode of production, one whose internal contradictions were leading to capitalism. Employing the class conflict analytic of Marx to the productive system that Marx believed would end such conflict for all time, Nee argued that it is state socialism, not capitalism, that "appropriates surplus directly from the immediate producers and creates and structures social inequality through the processes of its reallocation " (1989: 665) . Such ex propriation of surplus -exploitation -can be over come only if workers are given the opportunity to own and sell their own labour power. Only with markets, Nee insisted, could workers develop the power to "withhold their product" and protect their "labor power" (p. 666). This movement from one mode of production to another would shift power to the formerly oppressed class. "The tran sition from redistribution to markets," he conclud ed, "involves a transfer of power favoring direct producers" (ibid.).
A New "Transition"
In the juxtaposition between these formulations of modernity, socialism, and capitalism there lies a story. They describe not only competing theoreti cal positions but deep shifts in historical sensibility. We must understand both together, I believe, if ei ther contemporary history or contemporary theory is to be understood at all. Social scientists and historians have long talked about "the transition." An historical phrase, a so cial struggle, a moral transformation for better or for worse, the term referred, of course, to the movement from feudalism to capitalism. For Marxists, the transition initiated the unequal and and provides an analysis of the fate of modernization theory that bears a marked similarity to the one I un dertake here.
contradictory system that produced its antithesis, socialism and equality. For liberals, the transition represented an equally momentous transformation of traditional society but created a set of historical alternatives -democracy, capitalism, contracts and civil society -that did not have a moral or social counterfactual like socialism ready to hand. In the last five years, for the first time in the histo ry of social science, "the transition" has come to mean something that neither of these earlier treat ments could have foreseen. It is the transition from communism to capitalism, a phrase that seems oxymoronic even to our chastened ears. The sense of world-historical transformation remains, but the straight line of history seems to be running in re verse.
In this recent period we have witnessed perhaps the most dramatic set of spatially and temporally contiguous social transformations in the history of world. The more contemporary meaning of transi tion may not entirely eclipse the earlier one, yet there is no doubt that it has already diminished its significance and will arouse significantly more in tellectual interest for a long time to come. This second great transformation, to redirect Polanyi's (1944) famous phrase, has produced an unex pected, and for many an unwelcome, convergence in both history and social thought. It is impossible even for already committed intellectuals to ignore the fact that we are witnessing the death of a major alternative not only in social thought but in society itself.3 In the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that either citizens or elites will try to structure their primary allocative systems in non-market ways.4
3 This impossibility is strikingly expressed in the cri de coeur issued by Shoji Ishitsuka, one of Japan's lead ing Lukacs scholars and "critical theorists": "The whole history of Social Enlightenment, which was so great for its realization of the idea of equality, has well as so tragic for its enforcemnt of dictator ship, has ended ... The crisis of the human sciences [which as resulted] can be described as a crisis of recogniton. The progress-oriented historical viewpoint has totally disappeared because the historical move ment is now toward capitalism from socialism. The crisis also finds its expression in the whole decline of stage-oriented historical theory in general." (Ishit suka 1994) 4 "We should henceforth conclude that the future of socialism, if it has one, can only lie within capital ism," writes Steven Lukes (1990: 574) in an effort to come to grips with the new transitions. For an intelli gent, often anguished, and revealing intra-left de-For their part, social scientists will be far less likely to think of antimarket "socialist societies" as counterfactual alternatives with which to explain their own. They will be less likely to explain economic stratification by implicitly comparing it with an egalitarian distribution produced by publicly rather than privately held property, a "plausible world" (Hawthorn 1991 ) that inevitably seems to suggest that economic inequality is produced by the exis tence of private property itself. Social scientists will, perhaps, also be less likely to explain status stratification by postulating the counterfactual ten dency to communal esteem in a world that is uncor rupted by individualism of a bourgeois rather than socialist kind. Similarly, it will become much more difficult to speak about the emptiness of formal de mocracy, or to explain its limitations by pointing merely to the existence of a dominant economic class, for these explanations, too, require counterfactuals of a traditionally "socialist" kind. In brief, it will be much less easy to explain contemporary social problems by pointing to the capitalist nature of the societies of which they are a part. In this essay, I do not propose a return to "conver gence" or modernization theories of society as such, as some reinvirgorated propnents of the ear ly tradition (Inkeles 1991 , Lipset 1990 ) apparently do.5 * I will propose, however, that contemporary social theory must be much more sensitive to the apparent reconvergence of the world's regimes and that, as a result, we must try to incorporate some broad sense of the universal and shared elements of development into a critical, undogmatic, and re flective theory of social change. Indeed, in the conclusion of this essay I will demonstrate that a growing range of widely diverse contemporary so cial theorists, from literary radicals and rational choice theorists to postcommunists, are speaking convergence even if (apologies to Moliere) they bate on the ideological and empirical implications of these events, see the debate to which Lukes' essay forms a part: Goldfarb (1990) , Katznelson (1990) , Heilbroner (1990) and Campeanu (1990) . 5 For some contentious and revealing formulations of these issues, see the debate between Nikolai Genov, Piotr Sztompka, Franco Crespi, Hans Joas, myself, and other theorists in the 1991 and 1992 issues of Theory, the Newsletter of the Research Committee on Sociological Theory of the International Sociolog ical Association. Those exchanges, which reproduced many of the old lines of modernization versus antimodernization debate, demonstrated how difficult it is to step outside of binary thinking on the conver gence issue, for reasons that the following analysis of codes will make clear.
don't believe it is prose, and I will address the chal lenging question, recently raised so trenchantly by Muller (1992) , of whether this emerging conversa tion can avoid the relatively simplistic and totaliz ing form that obliterated the complexities of earli er societies and the particularisms of our own. Despite this new and more sophisticated form, however, what I will later call neo-modern theory will remain as much myth as science (Barbour 1974) , as much narrative as explanation (Entrikin 1991) . Even if one believes, as I do, that such a broader and more sophisticated theory of social development is now historically compelling, it re mains the case that every general theory of social change is rooted not only in cognition but in exis tence, that it possesses a surplus of meaning in Ricoeur's (1977) deeply suggestive phrase. Moderni ty, after all, has always been a highly relativist term (Pocock 1987 , Habermas 1981 , Bourricaud 1987 . It emerged in the fifth century when newly Chris tianized Romans wished to distinguish their religi osity from two forms of barbarians, the heathens of antiquity and the unregenerate Jews. In medi eval times, modernity was reinvented as a term im plying cultivation and learning, which allowed contemporary intellectuals to identify backward, with the classical learning of the Greek and Ro man heathens themselves. With the Enlighten ment, modernity became identified with rationali ty, science, and forward progress, a semantically arbitrary relationship that seems to have held steady to this day. Who can doubt that, sooner or later, a new historical period will displace this sec ond "age of equipoise" (Burn 1974 ) into which we have so inadvertently but fortuitously slipped. New contradictions will emerge and competing sets of world-historical possibilities will arise, and it is unlikely that they will be viewed in terms of the emerging neo-modernization frame. It is precisely this sense of the instability, of the im minent transitoriness of the world, that introduces myth into social theory. Despite the fact that we have no idea what our historical possibilities will be, every theory of social change must theorize not only the past but the present and future as well. We can do so only in a nonrational way, in relation not only to what we know but to what we believe, hope, and fear. Every historical period needs a narrative that defines its past in terms of the pre sent, and suggests a future that is fundamentally different, and typically "even better," than con temporary time. For this reason, there is always an eschatology, not merely an epistemology, in theo rizing about social change.
I proceed now to examine early modernization theory, its contemporary reconstruction, and the vigorous intellectual alternatives that arose in the period between.61 will insist throughout on the re lation of these theoretical developments to social and cultural history, for only in this way can we un derstand social theory not only as science but also as an ideology in the sense made famous by Geertz (1973) . For unless we recognize the interpenetra tion of science and ideology in social theory, nei ther element can be evaluated or clarified in a ra tional way. With this stricture in mind, I delineate four distinctive theoretical-cum-ideological peri ods in postwar social thought: modernization theo ry and romantic liberalism; antimodernization the ory and heroic radicalism; postmodern theory and comic detachment; and the emerging phase of neo-modernization or reconvergence theory, which seems to combine the narrative forms of each of its predecessors on the post-war scene. While I will be engaging in genealogy, locating the historical origins of each phase of post-war theory in an archaeology way, it is vital to keep in mind that each one of the theoretical residues of the phases which I examine remains vitally alive today. My archeology, on other words, is not only an in vestigation of the past but of the present. Because the present is history, this genealogy will help us to understand the theoretical sedimentation within which we live intellectually today.
Modernization: Code, Narrative, and Explanation
Drawing from a centuries-long tradition of evolu tionary and Enlightenment inspired theories of so-6 Paul Colomy and I (1992) have introduced the term "reconstruction" to indicate a path of scientific cu mulation that is more radical vis-a-vis the originating tradition than the kinds of efforts at specification, elaboration, or revision that more typically mark the efforts of social scientists who wish to keep their the oretical tradition alive in response to intellectual challenge and the loss of scientific prestige. Recon struction suggests that fundamental elements of the founder's "classical" work are changed, often by in corporating elements from its challengers, even while the tradition as such is defended, e.g., Haber mas's effort to "reconstruct historical materialism" in the mid-1970s. Reconstruction should also be distin guished from "theory creation," in which a funda mentally different theoretical tradition is created, e.g., Habermas' later effort to create the theory of communicative action.
cial change, "modernization" theory as such was born with the publication of Marian Levy's book on Chinese family structure (1949) and died some time in the mid-60s, during one of those extraordi narily heated rites of spring that marked student uprisings, antiwar movements, and newly human ist socialist regimes, and which preceded the long hot summers of the race riots and Black Con sciousness movement in the U.S.
Modernization theory can and certainly should be evaluated as a scientific theory, in the postpositiv ist, wissenschaftliche sense.7 As an explanatory ef fort, the modernization model was characterized by the following ideal-typical traits.8 * 1. Societies were conceived as coherently orga nized systems whose subsystems were closely inter dependent. 2. Historical development was parsed into two ty pes of social systems, the traditional and the mod ern, statuses which were held to determine the character of their societal subsystems in determi nate ways. 3. The modern was defined with reference to the social organization and culture of specifically West ern societies, which were typified as individualis tic, democratic, capitalist, scientific, secular, and stable, and as dividing work from home in genderspecifc ways. 4. As an historical process, modernization was held to involve nonrevolutionary, incremental change.
7 By scientific, I do not evoke the principles of empiri cism. I do mean to refer, however, to the explanatory ambition and propositions of a theory, which must be evaluated in their own terms. These can be interpre tive and cultural, eschew narrative or statistical cau sality and, indeed, the natural scientific form. By extra-scientific, I mean to refer to a theory's mythical or ideological function. 8 I draw here from a broad range of writings that ap peared in the 1950s and early 1960s by such figures as Daniel Lemer, Marion Levy, Alex Inkeles, Talcott Parsons, David Apter, Robert Bellah, S. N. Eisenstadt, Walt Rostow, and Clark Kerr. None of these au thors accepted each of these propositions as such, and some of them, as we will see, "sophisticated" them in significant ways. Nonetheless, these proposi tions can be accepted as forming the common de nominator upon which the great part of the tradi tion's explanatory structure was based. For an excel lent overview of this traditon that, while more de tailed, agrees in fundamental respects with the ap proach taken here, see Sztompka 1993: 129-136. 5. The historical evolution to modernity -mod ernization -was viewed as likely to succeed, thus assuring that traditional societies would be provid ed with the resources for what Parsons (1966) cal led a general process of adaptive "upgrading," in cluding economic take-off to industrialization, de mocratization via law, and secularization and sci ence via education. There were important aspects of truth in these models, which were articulated by thinkers of con siderable historical and sociological insight. One truth, for example, lay in the insight that there are functional not merely idealistic exigencies that push social systems toward democracy, markets, and the universalization of culture, and that shifts toward "modernity" in any subsystem create con siderable pressures on the others to respond in a complementary way.9 This understanding made it possible for the more sophisticated among them to make prescient predictions about the eventual in stability of state socialist societies, thus avoiding the rational-is-the-real embarrassments encoun tered by theorists of a more leftist kind. Thus, Par sons (1971: 127) insisted long before Perestroika "that the processes of democratic revolution have not reached an equilibrium in the Soviet Union and that further developments may well run broadly in the direction of Western types of demo cratic government, with responsibility to an elec torate rather than to a self-appointed party." It should perhaps also be emphasized that, whatever their faults, modernization theorists were not pro vincials. Despite their ideological intent, the most important of them rarely confused functional inter dependence with historical inevitability. Parsons' theorizing, for example (1962: 466, 474) , stressed that systemic exigencies actually opened up the possibility of historical choice.
Underneath the ideological conflicts [between capital ism and communism] that have been so prominent, there has been emerging an important element of very broad consensus at the level of values, centering in the 9 Probably the most sophisticated formulation of this truth is Smelser's elaboration (e.g., 1968) , during the final days of modernization theory, of how modern ization produced leads and lags between subsystems, a process which, borrowing from Trotsky, he called uneven and combined development. Like virtually every other important younger theorist of the peri od, Smelser eventually gave up on the modernization model, in his case for a "process" model (Smelser 1991 ) that delineated no particular epochal charac teristics and which allowed subsystems to interact in a highly open-ended way.
complex we often refer to as "modernization" ... Clear ly, definite victory for either side is not the only possible choice. We have another alternative, namely, the even tual integration of both sides -and of uncommitted units as well -in a wider system of order.10 1 1 * Despite these important insights, however, the his torical judgment of subsequent social thought has not erred in its evaluation of modernization theory as a failed explanatory scheme. Neither nonwes tern nor precontemporary societies can be concep tualized as internally homogeneous (cf., Mann 1986) . Their subsystems are more loosely coupled (e.g., Meyers/Rowan 1977, Alexander/Colomy 1990) and their cultural codes more independent (e.g., Hall 1985) . Nor is there the kind of dicho tomized historical development that can justify a single conception of traditional or modern, as Eisenstadt's (e.g., 1964; cf., Alexander 1992 ) exten sive investigations of "Axial Age" civilizations ma kes clear. Even the concept, "western society," built upon spatial and historical contiguity, fails sufficiently to recognize historical specificity and national variation. Social systems, moreover, are not as internally homogeneous as were supposed, nor are there necessarily grounds for optimism that modernization will succeed. In the first place, universalizing change is neither imminent nor de velopmental in an idealist sense; it is often abrupt, involving contingent positions of power, and can have murderous results.11 In the second place, even if one were to accept a linear conceptual scheme, one would have to acknowledge Nietzs che's observation that historical regression is just as possible as progress, indeed, perhaps even more likely. Finally, modernization, even if it does tri umph, does not necessarily increase social con tentment. It may be that the more highly devel oped a society, the more it produces, encourages, 10 I am grateful to Muller (1992: 118) for recalling this passage. Muller notes the "acute sense of reality" (ibid., I ll) displayed in modernization theory's "amazing hypotheses" (ibid., p. 112) about the even tual demise of state socialism. He insists, quite cor rectly in my view, that "it was not the [neo-Marxist] critique of capitalism in the 1970s which correctly read the secular trends of the late twentieth century -it was Parsons' theory" (ibid.). 11 "Seen historically, 'modernization' has always been a process propelled by inter-cultural exchange, mili tary conflicts and economic competition among states and power blocks -as, likewise, Western post war modernization took place within a newly created world order" (Muller 1992: 138) . See also the cri tiques of classical differentiation theory in Alexander (1988) and Alexander/Colomy (1990) .
and relies upon strident and often utopian expres sions of alienation and criticism (Dürkheim 1937 ). When we look back on a "scientifically invalidat ed" theory that dominated the thinking of an en tire intellectual stratum for two decades, those of us who are still committed to the project of a ratio nal and generalizing social science will be inclined to ask ourselves, why was it believed? While we would ignore at our peril the partial truths of mod ernization theory, we would not be wrong to con clude that there were extra-scientific reasons in volved. Social theory (Alexander/Colomy 1992) must be considered not only as a research program but as a generalized discourse, one very important part of which is ideology. It is as a meaning struc ture, as a form of existential truth, that social sci entific theory functions effectively in an extrascientific way.12 To understand modernization theory and its fate, then, we must examine it not only as a scientific theory but as an ideology -not in the mechanistic Marxist or more broadly Enlightenment sense (e.g., Boudon 1986) of "false consciousness" but in the Geertzian (1973) one. Modernization theory was a symbolic system that functioned not only to explain the world in a rational way, but to interpret the world in a manner that provided "meaning and motivation" (Bellah 1970b) . It functioned as a metalanguage that instructed people how to live. Intellectuals must interpret the world, not simply change or even explain it. To do so in a meaning ful, reassuring, or inspiring manner fashion means that intellectuals must make distinctions. They must do so especially in regard to phases of history. If intellectuals are to define the "meaning" of their 12 This existential or mythical dimension of social scien tific theory is generally ignored in interpretations of social scientific thought, except for those occasions when it is glossed as political ideology (e.g., Gouldner 1970) . Simmel acknowledged a genre of specula tive work in social science, which he called "philo sophical sociology," but he carefully differentiated it from the empirical disciplines or parts thereof. For example, he wrote in his Philosophy of Money that a philosophical sociology was necessary because there exist questions "that we have so far been unable ei ther to answer or to discuss" (quoted in Levine 1991: 99, italics added). As I see it, however, questions that are essentially unanswerable lie at the heart of all so cial scientific theories of change. This means that one cannot neatly separate the empirical from the nonempirical. In terms I employ below, even theorists in the social sciences are intellectuals, even if most in tellectuals are not social scientific theorists.
"time", they must identify a time that preceded the present, offer a morally compelling account of why it was superseded, and tell their audiences whether or not such a transformation will be repeated vis-avis the world they live in. This is, of course, merely to say that intellectuals produce historical narra tives about their own time.13 * The ideological dimension of modernization theo ry is further illuminated by thinking of this narra tive function in a structuralist, or semiotic way (Barthes 1977) . Because the existential unit of ref erence is one's own time, the empirical unit of ref erence must be totalized as one's own society. It must, in other words, be characterized as a whole regardless of the actual nature of its divisions and inconsistencies. Not only one's own time, then, but one's own society must be characterized by a single linguistic term, and the world that preceded the present must be characterized by another single broad term as well. In light of these consider ations, the important ideological, or meaning making function that modernization theory served seems fairly clear. For Western but especially American and American-educated intellectuals, modernization theory provided a telos for postwar society by making it "historical." It did so by pro viding postwar society with a temporal and spatial identity, an identity that could be formed only in a relation of difference with another, immediately preceding time and place. As Pocock has recently emphasized, "modernity" must be understood as the "consciousness rather than the condition of be ing 'modern'." Taking a linguistic model of con sciousness, he suggests that such consciousness must be defined as much by difference as identifi cation. The modern is a "signifier" that functions as an "excluder" at the same time.
13 "We can comprehend the appeal of historical dis course by recognizing the extent to which it makes the real desirable, makes the real into an object of desire, and does so by its imposition, upon events that are represented as real, of the formal coherency that stories possess ... The reality that is represented in the historical narrative, in 'speaking itself,' speaks to us .. and displays to us a formal coherency that we ourselves lack. The historical narrative, as against the chronicle, reveals to us a world that is putatively 'finished,' done with, over, and yet not dissolved, not falling apart. In this world, reality wears the mask of a meaning, the completeness and fullness of which we can only imagine, never experience. Insofar as historical stories can be completed, can be given nar rative closure, can be shown to have had a plot all along, they give to reality the odor of the ideal." (White 1980 : 20, original italics)
We call something (perhaps ourselves) modern in order to distance that of which we speak from some anteced ent state of affairs. The antecedent is most unlikely to be of neutral effect in defining either what is to be called "modern" or the "modernity" attributed to it (Pocock 1987: 48) .
If I may give to this approach a late-Durkheimian turn (Alexander 1989) , I would like to suggest that we think of modernity as constructed upon a bina ry code. This code serves the mythological func tion of dividing the known world into the sacred and profane, thereby providing a clear and com pelling picture of how contemporaries must act to manoeuvre the space in between.14 In this sense, the discourse of modernity bears a striking resem blance to metaphysical and religious salvation dis course of diverse kinds (Weber 1964 , Walzer 1965 . It also resembles the more secular dichotomizing discourses that citizens employ to identify them selves with, and to distance themselves from, the diverse individuals, styles, groups, and structures in contemporary societies (Wagner-Pacifici 1986 , Bourdieu 1984 . It has been argued, in fact , Alexander/Smith 1993 , that a "discourse of civil soci ety" provides a structured semiotic field for the conflicts of contemporary societies, positing ideal ized qualities like rationality, individuality, trust, and truth as essential qualities for inclusion in the modern, civil sphere, while identifying qualities such as irrationality, conformity, suspicion, and de ceit as traditional traits that demand exclusion and punishment. There is a striking overlap between these ideological constructions and the explanato ry categories of modernization theory, for example Parsons' pattern variables. In this sense, modern ization theory may be seen as a generalizing and abstracting effort to transform an historically spe cific categorical scheme into a scientific theory of development applicable to any culture around the entire world. Because every ideology is carried by an intellectual cadre (Konrad/Szelenyi 1974 , Eisenstadt 1986 , it is important to ask why the intellectual cadre in a particular time and place articulated and promot ed a particular theory. In regard to modernization Memoires (Aron 1990 Rand 1957) . On every side of the political spec trum, in other words, American intellectuals were motivated by a sense of dramatic and bifurcating social change. This was the social basis for con structing the traditional/modern binary code, an experience of bifurcation that demanded an inter pretation of present anxieties, and future possibili ties, in relation to the imagined past.
To fully understand the interrelation between his tory and theory that produced the new intellectu als, however, we must think about narrativity in addition to symbolic structure. In order to do so, we will draw upon the dramaturgical terms of genre theory, which stretches from Aristotle's poet ics to the path-setting literary criticism of Northrop Frye (1957) , which inspired the more recent "nega tive hermeneutics" of historically-oriented literary critics like White (1987) , Jameson (1980 ), Brooke (1984 ), and Fussell (1975 .18 * if stricken ... the retreat to a more conservative exis tence was disorderly, the fear of communism spread like an irrational hail of boils. To anyone who could see, the excessive hysteria of the Red wave was no preparation to face an enemy, but rather a terror of the national self." (Mailer 1987 [I960]: 14) . 17 It terms of the break induced in American intellectu als by the postwar period, it is revealing to compare this later change theory of Parsons with his earlier one. In the essays on social change he composed in the decade after 1937, Parsons consistently took Ger many as his model, emphasizing the destablilizing, polarizing, and antidemocratic implications of social differentiation and rationalization. When he referred to modernization in this period, and he rarely did, he employed the term to refer to a pathological, over rationalizing process, one that produced the symp tomatic reaction of "traditionalism." After 1947, Par sons took the United States as the type case for*his studies of social change, relegating Nazi Germany to the status of deviant case. Modernization and tradi tionalism were now viewed as structural processes rather than as ideologies, symptoms, or social ac tions. 18 It is ironic that one of the best recent explications of, and justifications for, Frye's version of generic history can be found in the Marxist criticism of Jameson,
In such dramaturgical terms we can characterize the historical period that preceded the era of mod ernization theory as one in which intellectuals "in flated" the importance of actors and events by emplotting them in a heroic narrative. The 1930's and the war years that followed defined a period of in tense social conflict that generated millennialworld-historical -hopes for utopian social trans formation, either through communist and fascist revolutions or the construction of an unprecedent ed kind of "welfare state." Post-war American in tellectuals, by contrast, experienced the social world in more "deflationary" terms. With the fail ure of revolutionary proletarian movements in Eu rope and the head-long rush to normalization and which purports to refute its bourgeois form yet ma kes heavy use of its substantive content. Jameson (1980: 130) calls Frye's method a "positive herme neutic" because "his identification of mythic patterns in modern texts aims at reinforcing our sense of the affinity between the cultural present of capitalism and the distant mythical past of tribal societies, and at awakening a sense of the continuity between our psychic life and that of primitive peoples." He offers his "negative hermeneutic" as an alternative, assert ing that it uses "the narrative raw material shared by myth and 'historical' literatures to sharpen our sense of historical difference, and to stimulate an increas ingly vivid apprehension of what happens when plot falls into history ... and enters the force fields of the modern societies" (ibid.) Despite the fact that Jameson is wedded to a reflec tion theory of ideology, he produces, in fact, an ex cellent rationale for the use of genre analysis in un derstanding historical conflicts. He argues that an in fluential social "text" must be understood as "a so cially symbolic act, as the ideological -but formal and immanent -response to a historical dilemma" (ibid., p. 139). Because of the strains in the social en vironment that call texts forth, "it would seem to fol low that, properly used, genre theory must always in one way or another project a model of the coexis tence or tension between several generic modes or strands." With this "methodological axiom," Jame son suggests, "the typologizing abuses of traditional genre theory criticism are definitely laid to rest" (ibid., p. 141).
For the relevance of generic theory to the analysis of social rather literary texts, see the historical writings of Slotkin (1973) , the sociological studies of WagnerPacifici (1986) and Gibson (1991) , and more recently the work of Margaret R. Somers (e.g., 1992) . For the particularities of my own approach to social genre and its relation to cultural codes, I am indebt ed to conversations with Philip Smith (1991 Smith ( , 1993 and Steven Sherwood (1994) , whose own writings are important theoretical statements in their own right.
demobilization in the United States, the heroic "grand narratives" of collective emancipation seemed less compelling.19 No longer was the pre sent perceived primarily as a way station to an al ternative social order, but, rather, as more or less the only possible system there ever could be. Such a deflationary acceptance of "this world" was not necessarily distopian, fatalistic, or conserva tive. In Europe and America, for example, there emerged a principled anticommunism that wove together the bare threads of a collective narrative and committed their societies to social democracy. Yet, even for these reformist groups, the deflation of prewar social narratives had strong effects, ef fects that were very widely shared. Intellectuals as a group became more "hard-headed" and "realis tic." Realism diverges radically from the heroic narrative, inspiring a sense of limitation and re straint rather than idealism and sacrifice. Black and white thinking, so important for social mobili zation, is replaced by "ambiguity" and "complexi ty," terms favored by New Critics like Empson (1927) and particularly Trilling (1950) , and by "skepticism," a position exemplified in Niebuhr's writings (e.g., Niebuhr 1952). The conviction that one has been "born again" -this time to the social sacred -which inspires utopian enthusiasm, is suc ceeded by the "thrice born" chastened soul de scribed by Bell (1962c) and by an acute sense that the social God has failed (Crossman 1950) . In deed, this new realism convinced many that narra tive itself -history -had been eclipsed, which pro duced the representations of this newly "modern" society as the "end of ideology" (Bell 1962a ) and the portrayal of the postwar world as "industrial" (Aron 1962 , Lipset/Bendix 1960 rather than as capitalistic. Yet, while realism was a significant mood in the postwar period, it was not the dominant narrative frame through which postwar social science intel-19 By using the postmodern term "grand narrative" (Lyotard 1985) , I am committing anachronism, but I am doing so in order to demonstrate the lack of his torical perspective implied by the postmodernist slo gan, "the end of the grand narrative." Grand narra tives, in fact, are subjected to periodic historical de flation and inflation, and there are always other, less inflated generic constructions "waiting" to take their place. I will point out below, indeed, that there are important similarities between the postwar period of narrative deflation and the 1980s, which produced a broadly similar intuming that postmodernism char acterized to such great effect as an historically un precedented social fact.
lectuals charted their times. Romanticism was.20 * Relatively deflated in comparison with heroism, romanticism tells a story that is more positive in its evaluation of the world as it exists today. In the postwar period it allowed intellectuals and their audiences to believe that progress would be more or less continuously achieved, that improvement was likely. This state of grace referred, however, more to individuals than to groups, and to incre mental rather than revolutionary change. In the new world that emerged from the ashes of war, it had finally become possible to cultivate one's own garden. This cultivation would be an enlightened, modernist work, regulated by the cultural patterns of achievement and neutrality (Parsons and Shils 1951) , culminating in the "active" (Etzioni 1968) and "achieving" (McClelland 1953) society. Romanticism, in other words, allowed America's postwar social science intellectuals, even in a peri od of relative narrative deflation, to continue to speak the language of progress and universaliza tion. In the United States, what differentiates ro mantic from heroic narratives is the emphasis on the self and private life. In America's social narra tives, heroes are epochal; they lead entire peoples to salvation, as collective representations like the American revolution and the civil rights movement indicate. Romantic evolution, by contrast, is not collective; it is about Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn (Fiedler 1955) , about the yeoman farmer (Smith 1950) , and Horatio Alger. American intellectuals, then, articulated modernization as a process that freed the self and made society's subsystems re sponsive to its needs. In this sense modernization theory was behavioral and pragmatic; it focussed on real individuals rather than on a collective his torical subject like nation, ethnic group, or class. Existentialism was basic to the romantic American ideology of "modernism." American intellectuals, indeed, developed an idiosyncratic, optimistic reading of Sartre. In the milieu saturated with exis tentialism, "authenticity" became a central crite rion for evaluating individual behavior, an empha sis that was central to Lionell Trilling's (1955) mod ernist literary criticism but also permeated social theory that ostensibly did not advocate moderniza tion, for example, Erving Goffman's (1956) micro sociology, with its equation of freedom with role distance and its conception of back-versus-front stage,21 and David Reisman's (1950) eulogy for the inner-directed man. These individualistic romantic narratives stressed the challenge of being modern, and they were complemented by an emphasis on irony, the narra tive Frye defines as deflationary vis-a-vis romance but not downright negative in its effects. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the modernist aesthetic in England and America stressed irony, introspec tion, ambiguity. The dominant literary theory, socalled New Criticism, while tracing its origins back to Empson's The Seven Types o f Ambiguity (1927), came into its own only after the heroic and much more historicist criticism of the 1930s. The key contemporary figure in American letters was Lio nel Tilling, who defined the psychological and aes thetic goal of modernity as the expansion of com plexity and tolerance for ambiguity. Psychoanaly sis was a major critical approach, interpreted as an exercise in introspection and moral control (Rieff 1959) . In graphic art, "modern" was equated with abstraction, the revolt against decoration, and with minimalism, all of which were interpreted as drawing attention away from the surface and pro viding pathways into the inner self. It is evidently difficult, at this remove, for contem porary postmodern and post-postmodern intellec tuals to recapture the rich and, indeed, often enno bling aspects of this intellectual and aesthetic mod ernism, almost as difficult as it is for contemporar ies to see the beauty and passion of modernist ar chitecture that Pevsner (1949) so effectively cap tured in his epoch-defining Pioneers o f Modern Design. The accounts of intellectual-cum-aesthetic modernism proffered by contemporary postmo dernists -from Baumann (1989) , , and Lasch (1985 to Harvey (1989) and Ja meson (1988) -is a fundamental misreading. Their construction of it as dehumanizing abstraction, mechanism, fragmentation, linearity, and domina tion, I will suggest below, says much more about the ideological exigencies that they and other con temporary intellectuals are experiencing today than it does about modernism itself. In culture, in theory, and in art, modernism represented a spare ness that devalued artifice not only as decoration but as pretension, and undercut utopianism as a collective delusion that was homologous with neu rosis of an individual kind (Fromm 1955 (Fromm , 1956 viewing American rationality as instrumental rath er than moral and expressive, big science as tech nocratic rather than inventive. They saw conformi ty rather than independence; power elites rather than democracy; and deception and disappoint ment rather than authenticity, responsibility, and romance.
In the 50s and early 60s, these social critics did not become highly influential. To do so they would have had to pose a compelling alternative, a new 22 The present account does not, in other words, as sume complete intellectual consensus during the phases described. Counter trends existed, and they should be noted. There is also the very real possibili ty (see n. 28, below) that intellectuals and their audi ences had access to more than one code/narrative at any given point in historical time, an access that Wagner-Padfici (personal communication) calls dis cursive hybridity. My account does suggest, however, that each of these phases was marked, indeed was in part constructed by, the hegemony of one intellectual framework over others. Narratives are constructed upon binary codes, and it is the polarity of binary op positions that allows historicizing intellectuals to make sense of their time. "Binarism" is less an eso teric theoretical construct than an existential fact of life.
heroic narrative to describe how the sick society could be transformed and a healthy one put in its place. 
Antimodernization Theory: The Heroic Revival
Sometime in the later 1960s, between the assassi nation of President Kennedy and the San Francis co "love" summer of 1967, modernization theory died. It died because the emerging younger gener ation of intellectuals could not believe it was true. Even if we regard social theory as semiotic system rather than pragmatically inducted generalization, it is a sign system whose signifieds are empirical re ality in a rather strictly disciplined sense. So it is 23 This points to one quibble I have with Jameson and Eyerman's Seeds o f the Sixties (1994), their brilliant account of these critical intellectuals in the 1950's. Jameson and Eyerman argue that they failed to exert influence, not primarely because of the conservatism of the dominant society. It seems important to add, however, that their own ideology was partly responsi ble, for it was insufficiently historical in the futureoriented, narrative sense. A more important dis agreement would be that Jameson and Eyerman seem to accept "mass society" as an actual empirical description of both social structural and cultural modernization in the fifties. In so doing, they may be mistaking an intellectual account for a social reality. These vestiges of a realist epistemology -in what is otherwise an acutely cultural and constructivist ap proach -makes impossible to appreciate the compel ling humanism that informed so much of the work of the very fifties intellectuals whom these critics often attacked.
important to recognize that during this second postwar period serious "reality problems" began to intrude on modernization theory in a serious way. Despite the existence of capitalist markets, poverty persisted at home (Harrington 1962) and perhaps was even increasing in the third world. Revolutions and wars continually erupted outside of Europe and North America (Johnson 1983) , and sometimes even seemed to be produced by mod ernization itself. Dictatorship, not democracy was spreading throughout the rest of the world (Moore 1966 (1964) . Among the contributors were leading modernization social scientists, who grappled with the increasingly visible anomalies of this theory, par ticularly the continuing role of utopian and revolu tionary ideology in the third world, which inspired revolutions, and, more generally, with the failure of "progressive" modernizing development. Geertz's "Ideology as a Cultural System," so central to devel opments in post-modernization theories, appeared first in this volume. Apter himself, incidentally, dem onstrated a personal theoretical evolution paralleling the broader shifts documented here, moving from an enthusiastic embrace, and explication, of Third World modernization, which concentrated on univer sal categories of culture and social structure (see, e.g., Apter 1963) , to a post-modern skepticism about "liberating" change and an emphasis on cultural par ticularity. This latter position is indicated by the self consciously antimodernist and antirevolutionary themes in the striking deconstruction of Maoism that Apter (1987) published in the late 1980s. The intel lectual careers of Robert Bellah and Michael Walzer (cf., my discussion of Smelser's shifting concerns in n. 9, above) reveal similar though not identical con tours. These examples and others (see n. 21, above) raise the intriguing question that Mills described as the re lationship between history and biography. How did individual intellectuals deal with the historical suc cession of code/narrative frames, which pushed them Factual problems, however, are not enough to cre ate scientific revolutions. Broad theories can de fend themselves by defining and protecting a set of core propositions, jettisoning entire segments of their perspective as only peripherally important. Indeed, if one looks closely at modernization theo ry during the middle and late 1960s, and even dur ing the early 1970's, one can see an increasing so phistication as it geared up to meet its critics and to address the reality problems of the day. Dualistic simplifications about tradition and modernity were elaborated -not replaced by -notions that por trayed a continuum of development, as in the later neo-evolutionary theories of Parsons (1964 Parsons ( , 1966 Parsons ( , 1971 , Bellah (1964) , and Eisenstadt (1964) . Con vergence was reconceptualized to allow parallel but independent pathways to the modern (e.g., Shils [1972] on India, Eisenstadt [1963] on em pires, Bendix [1965] on citizenship). Notions like diffusion and functional substitutes were proposed to deal with the modernization of non Western civi lizations in a less ethnocentric manner (Bellah 1957; Cole 1979) . The postulate of tight subsystem links was replaced by the notion of leads and lags (Smelser 1968) , the insistance on interchange be came modified by notions of paradoxes (Schluchter 1979), contradictions (Eisenstadt 1963) , and strains (Smelser 1963) . Against the metalanguage of evolution, notions about developmentalism and globalism (Nettle and Robertson 1968) were suggested. Secularly gave way to ideas about civil religion (Bellah 1970b ) and by references to "the tradition of the modern" (Gusfield 1976 ). Against these internal revisions, antagonistic theo ries of antimodernization were proposed on the grounds that they were more valid explanations of the reality problems that emerged. Moore (1966) replaced modernization and evolution with revolu tion and counterrevolution. Thompson (1963) re placed abstractions about evolving patterns of in dustrial relations with class history and conscious ness from the bottom up. Discourse about exploi tation and inequality (e.g., Goldthlprpe 1969 , Mann 1973 ) contended with, and eventually dis into interstitial positions vis-a-vis the "new world of our time"? Some remained committed to their earli er frameworks and became, as a result, either perma nently or temporarily "obsolete." Others changed their frameworks and became contemporary, not necessarily for opportunistic reasons but because of personal encounters with profoundly jarring histori cal experiences, which sometimes gave them a keen appreciation for "the new."
placed, discussions of stratification and mobility. Conflict theories (Coser 1956 , Dahrendorf 1959 , Rex 1961 ) replaced functional ones; state centered political theories (Bendix et al. 1968 , Collins 1976 , Skocpol 1979 , Evans et al., 1985 replaced value centered and multidimensional approaches; and conceptions of binding social structures were chal lenged by microsociologies that emphasized the liquid, unformed, and negotiated character of ev eryday life.
What pushed modernization theory over the edge, however, were not these scientific alternatives in and of themselves. Indeed, as I have indicated, the revisors of the earlier theory had themselves begun to offer coherent, equally explanatory theories for many of the same phenomena. The decisive fact in modernization theory's defeat, rather, was the de struction of its ideological, discursive, and mytho logical core. The challenge that finally could not be met was existential. It emerged from new social movements that were increasingly viewed in terms of collective emancipation -peasant revolutions on a world-wide scale, black and Chicano national movements, indigenous people's rebellions, youth culture, hippies, rock music, and women's libera tion. Because these movements (e.g., Weiner 1984) , profoundly altered the Zeitgeist -the expe rienced tempo of the times -they captured the ideological imaginations of the rising cadre of in tellectuals.
In order to represent this shifting empirical and ex istential environment, intellectuals developed a new explanatory theory. Equally significant, they inverted the binary code of modernization and "narrated the social" (Sherwood 1994 ) in a new way. In terms of code, "modernity" and "modern ization" moved from the sacred to the profane side of historical time, with modernity assuming many of the crucial characteristics that had earlier been associated with traditionalism and backwardness. Rather than democracy and individualization, the contemporary modern period was represented as bureaucratic and repressive. Rather than a free market or contractual society, modern America be came "capitalist," no longer rational, interdepen dent, modern, and liberating but backward, greedy, anarchic, and impoverishing.
This inversion of the sign and symbols associated with modernity polluted the movements associat ed with its name. The death of liberalism (Lowi 1969 ) was announced, and its reformist origins in the early twentieth century dismissed as a camou flage for extending corporate control (Weinstein 1968 , Kolko 1967 . Tolerance was associated with fuzzy-mindedness, immorality, and repression (Wolfe et al. 1965) . The asceticism of Western reli gion was criticized for its repressive modernity and Eastern and mystical religious were sacralized in stead (Brown 1966 , cf., Brown 1959 . Modernity was equated with the mechanism of the machine (Roszak 1969) . For the third world, democracy was defined as a luxury, strong states a necessity. Markets were not luxuries but enemies, for capi talism came to be represented as guaranteeing underdevelopment and backwardness. This inver sion of economic ideals carried into the first world as well. Humanistic socialism replaced welfare state capitalism as the ultimate symbol of the good. Capitalist economies were held to produce only great poverty and great wealth (Kolko 1962) , and capitalist societies were viewed as sources of ethnic conflict (Bonacich 1972), fragmentation, and alienation (Oilman 1971). Not market society but socialism would provide wealth, equality, and a restored community. These recodings were accompanied by fundamen tal shifts in social narratives. Intellectual myths were inflated upwards, becoming stories of collec tive triumph and heroic transformation. The pre sent was reconceived, not as the denouement of a long struggle but as a pathway to a different, much better world.25 In this heroic myth, actors and groups in the present society were conceived as be ing "in struggle" to build the future. The individu alized, introspective narrative of romantic mod ernism disappeared, along with ambiguity and iro ny as preferred social values (Gitlin 1987: 377-406) . Instead, ethical lines were sharply drawn and political imperatives etched in black and white. In literary theory, the new criticism gave way to the new historicism (e.g., Veeser 1989) . In psychology, the moralist Freud was now seen as antirepressive, erotic, and even polymorphously per verse (Brown 1966 The historical vignette with which I opened this es say provides an illustration of this shift in sensibili ty. In his confrontation with Inkeies, Wallerstein portentously announced, "the time has come to put away childish things, and look reality in the face" (1979:133). He was not adopting here a real ist frame but rather donning a heroic guise. For it was emancipation and revolution that marked the narrative rhetoric of the day, not, as Weber might have said, the hard dreary task of facing up to workaday demands. To be realistic, Wallerstein suggested, was to realize that "we are living in the transition" to a "socialist mode of production, our future world government " (1979: 136) . The exis tential question he put to his listeners was, "How are we relating to it?" He suggested that there were only two alternatives. They could relate to the imminent revolution "as rational militants con tributing to it or as clever obstructors of it (wheth er of the malicious or cynical variety)." The rhetor ical construction of these alternatives demon strates how the inversion of binary coding (the clear line between good and bad, with modernity being polluted) and the creation of a newly heroic narrative (the militantly millennial orientation to future salvation) were combined.27 * Wallerstein made these remarks, it will be recalled, in a scien tific presentation, later published as "Moderniza tion: requiescat in pace." He was one of the most influential and original social scientific theorists of the anti-modernization theory phase. The social theories that this new generation of rad ical intellectuals produced can and must be consid ered in scientific terms (see, e.g., van den Berg 1980 and Alexander 1987 porary social science long after the ideological to talities in which they were initially imbedded have since disappeared.28 Yet to study the decline of a mode of knowledge, I would insist once again, de mands broader, extra-scientific considerations as well. Theories are created by intellectuals in their search for meaning. In response to continuing so cial change, generational shifts occur that can make the scientific and ideological efforts of earli er intellectual generations seem not only empiri cally implausible but psychologically shallow, po litically irrelevant, and morally obsolete. By the end of the 1970s, the energy of the radical social movements of the preceding period had dis sipated. Some of their demands become institu tionalized; others were blocked by massive back-28 This brief aside about the "lag" in generational pro duction is important to emphasize. It is primarily new generations coming to political and cultural selfconsciousness that produces new intellectual ideolo gies and theories, and, as Mannheim first empha sized, generational identities tend to remain constant despite shifts in historical time. The result is that, at any given point, the "intellectual milieu" considered as a totality will contain a number of competing ideo logical formulations produced by historicallygenerated archaeological formations. Insofar as there remain authoritative intellectual figures within each generation, furthermore, earlier intellectual ideologies will continue to socialize some members of succeeding generations. Authoritative socializa tion, in other words, exacerbates the lag effect, which is further increased by the fact that access to the organizational infrastructures of socializatione.g., control of graduate training programs in major universities, editorships of leading journals -may be attained by the authoritative members of generations whose ideology/theory may already be "refuted" by developments that are occurring among younger generations. These considerations produce layering effects that make it difficult to recognize intellectual successions until long after they are crystallized. These inertial effects of generational formations sug gest that new ideologies/theories may have to re spond not only to the immediately preceding forma tion -which is their primary reference point -but in a secondary way to all the formations that remain in the social milieu at the time of their formation. For example, while postmodernism will be portrayed here as a response primarily to antimodemization theories of revolutionary intent, it is also marked by the need to posit the inadequacy of postwar modern ism and, indeed, of prewar Marxism. As I indicate below, however, postmodernism' s responses to the latter movements are mediated by their primary re sponse to the ideology/theory immediately preceding it. Indeed, it only understands the earlier movements as they have been screened by the sixties generation.
lash movements that generated conservative pub lics and brought right-wing governments to power. The cultural-cum-political shift was so rapid as to seem, once again, to represent some kind of historical-cum-epistemological break.29 Material ism replaced idealism among political influentials, and surveys reported increasingly conservative views among young people and university stu dents. Maoist ideologues -one thinks of BernardHenri Levy (1977) in Paris and David Horowitz (1989) in the U.S. -became anticommunist nouvelle philosophes and, some of them, neoconserv atives. Yippies became yuppies. For many intellec tuals who had matured during the radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s, these new developments brought unbearable disappointment. Parallels with the 1950s were evident. The collective and heroic nar rative of socialism once again had died, and the end of ideology seemed once again to be at hand.
Postmodemization Theory:
Defeat, Resignation, and Comic Detachment "Postmodernism" can be seen as an explanatory social theory that has produced new middle range models of culture (Lyotard 1984 , Foucault 1976 , Huyssen 1984 , science and epistemology (Rorty 1979) , class (Bourdieu 1984), social action (Crespi 1992) , gender and family relations (Halpern 1990 , and economic life (Harvey 1989 , Lasch 1985 . theory of the middle range, however, that postmo dernism has made its mark. These discussions have become significant only because they are taken to exemplify broad new trends of history, social struc ture, and moral life. Indeed, it is by intertwining the levels of structure and process, micro and mac ro, with strong assertions about the past, present, and future of contemporary life that postmodern ism has formed a broad and inclusive general theo ry of society, one which, like the others we have considered here, must be considered in extrascientific terms, not only as an explanatory source. If we consider postmodernism as myth -not mere ly as cognitive descriptions but as their coding and narration into a "meaningful" frame -we must deal with it as the successor ideology to radical so cial theory, animated by the failure of reality to un fold in a manner that was consistent with the ex pectations generated by that antimodernization creed. From this perspective, we can see that while postmodernism seems to be coming to grips with the present and future, its horizon is fixed by the past. Initially (at least) an ideology of intellectual disappointment, Marxist and postMarxist intellec tuals articulated postmodernism in reaction to the fact that the period of heroic and collective radical ism seemed to be slipping away.31 They redefined 31 In December, 1986, The Guardian, a leading inde pendent British newspaper broadly on the Left, ran a three-day long major series, "Modernism and PostModernism." In his introductory article, Richard Gott announced, by way of explanation, that "the revolutionary impulses that had once galvanized pol itics and culture had clearly become sclerotic" (quot ed in Thompson 1992: 222 ). Thompson's own analy sis of this event is particularly sensitive to the central role played in it by the historical deflation of the he roic revolutionary myth. "Clearly this newspaper thought the subject of an al leged cultural shift from modernism to post modernism sufficiently important for it to devote many pages and several issues to the subject. The reason it was considered important is indicated by the sub-heading: "Why did the revolutionary move ment that lit up the early decades of the century fiz zle out. In a major series, Guardian critics analyze late twentieth century malaise" ... "The subsequent articles made it even clearer that the cultural "mal aise" represented by the shift from modernism was regarded as symptomatic of a deeper social and polit ical malaise." (ibid.). The stretching of revolutionary fervor, and the very term "modernism," to virtually the entirety of the pre-postmodernism twentieth century -sometimes, indeed, to the entire post-Enlightenment era -is a tendency common to postmodernist theory. A natuthis exalted collective present, which had been held to presage an even more heroic imminent fu ture, as a period that was now passed. They de clared that it had been superseded not for reasons of political defeat but because of the structure of history itself.32 The defeat of utopia had threat ened a mythically incoherent possibility, namely that of historical retrogression. It threatened to un dermine the meaning structures of intellectual life. With postmodern theory, this imminent defeat could be transformed into an immanent one, a ne cessity of historical development itself. The heroic "grand narratives" of the Left had merely been made irrelevant by history; they were not actually defeated. Myth could still function. Meaning was preserved.
The most influential early attributions of postmo dernism were filled with frank revelations of theo retical perplexity, testimonies to dramatic shifts in reality, and expressions of existential despair. Frederick Jameson (1988: 25) , for example, identi fied a "new and virtually unimaginable quantum leap in technological alienation." Despite his methodological commitments, Jameson resists the impulse to fall back on the neo-Marxism certain ties of the earlier age. Asserting that shifts in the productive base of society had created the superstructural confusions of a transitional time, he be moaned (ibid., 15) "the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the great global multina tional and decentered communication network in which we find ourselves caught as individual sub jects." Referring to the traditional role of art as a vehicle for gaining cultural clarity, Jameson com plained that this meaning-making reflex had been blocked: we are "unable to focus our own present, as though we have become incapable of achieving aesthetic representations of our own current expe rience" (ibid., 20).33 ral reflection of its binary and narrative functions, such broad claims play a vital role in situating the "postmodern" age vis-a-vis the future and the past. 32 "La revolution qu'anticipaient les avant-gardes et les partis d'extr&me gauche and que ddnouncaient les penseurs et les organisations de droit ne s'est pas produite. Mais les soci6t6s avanc£s n'en ont pas moins subi£s une transformation radicale. Tel est le constat commun que font les sociologues ... qui ont fait de la postmodernitie le th£me de leurs analyses." (Herpin 1993: 295) Postmodern theory, then, may be seen, in rather precise terms, as an attempt to redress the problem of meaning created by the experienced failure of "the sixties." Only in this way can we understand why the very dichotomy between modern and postmodern was announced, and why the contents of these new historical categories are described in the ways they are. From the perspective developed here, the answers seem clear enough. Continuity with the earlier period of antimodern radicalism is maintained by the fact that postmodernism, too, takes "the modem" as its explicit foe. In the binary coding of this intellectual ideology, modernity re mains on the polluted side, representing "the oth er" in postmodernism's narrative tales. Yet, in this third phase of postwar social theory, the contents of the modem are completely changed. Radical intellectuals had emphasized the privacy and particularism of modem capitalism, its provin ciality, and the fatalism and resignation it pro duced. The post-modernization alternative they posited was, not postmodern, but public, heroic, collective, and universal. It is precisely these latter qualities, of course, that postmodernization theory has condemned as the very embodiment of moder nity itself. In contrast, they have coded privacy, di minished expectations, subjectivism, individuality, and collective culture which lie beyond the bound aries of our own world," describing them as the "yet unrealized, collective, and decentered cultural pro duction of the future, beyond realism and modern ism alike" (1980: 11). Scarcely a decade later, what Jameson found to beyond modernism turned out to be quite different from the collective and liberating cultural he had sought.
particularity, and localism as the embodiments of the good. As for narrative, the major historical propositions of postmodernism -the decline of the grand narrative and the return to the local (Lyo tard 1984), the rise of the empty symbol, or simu lacrum (Baudrillard 1983), the end of socialism (Gorz 1982) , the emphasis on plurality and differ ence (Seidman ,1992 -are transparent repre sentations of a deflationary narrative frame. They are responses to the decline of "progressive" ideol ogies and their utopian beliefs.
The resemblances to radical antimodernism, then, are superficial and misleading. In fact, there is a much more significant connection between post modernism and the period that preceded radical ism, that is, modernization theory itself. Modern ization theory, we recall, was itself a deflationary ideology following an earlier heroic period of radi cal quest. It, too, contained emphases on the pri vate, the personal, and the local.
While these similarities reveal how misleading the intellectual self-representations of intellectual ide ologies can be, it is obviously true that the two ap proaches differ in fundamental ways. These differ ences emerge from their positions in concrete his torical time. The postwar liberalism that inspired modernization theory followed upon a radical movement that understood transcendence within a progressivist frame, one which, while aiming to radicalize modernism, hardly rejected it. Thus, while the romantic and ironic dimensions of post war liberalism deflated heroic modernism, its movement away from radicalism made central as pects of modernism even more accessible.
Postmodernism, by contrast, followed upon a radi cal intellectual generation which had condemned not only liberal modernism but key tenets of the very notion of modernization as such. The New Left rejected the Old Left in part because it was wedded to the modernization project; they pre ferred the Frankfurt School (e.g., Jay 1970), whose roots in German romanticism coincided more neatly with its own, antimodernist tone. While postmodernism, then, is indeed a deflation ary narrative vis-a-vis heroic radicalism, the speci ficity of its historical position means that it must place both heroic (radical) and romantic (liberal) versions of the modem onto the same negative side. Successor intellectuals tend to invert the bi nary code of the previously hegemonic theory. For postmodernism, the new code, modernism: post modernism, implied a larger break with "univer salist" Western values than did the traditionalism: modernism of the immediate postwar period or the capitalist modernism: socialist anti-modernization dichotomy that succeeded it.34 In narrative terms as well there are much greater deflationary shifts. Although there remains, to be sure, a romantic tenor in some strands of postmo dernist thought, and even collectivist arguments for heroic liberation, these "constructive" versions (Thompson 1992; Rosenau 1992 ) focus on the per sonal and the intimate and tend to be offshoots of social movements of the 1960s, e.g., gay and lesbi an "struggles," the women's "movement," and the ecology activists like Greens. Insofar as they do engage public policy, such movements articulate their demands much more in the language of dif ference and particularism (e.g., than in the universalistic terms of the collec tive good. The principal, and certainly the most distinctive thrust of the postmodern narrative, moreover, is strikingly different. Rejecting not on ly heroism but romanticism as well, it tends to be more fatalistic, critical, and resigned, in short more comically agnostic, than these more political movements of uplift and reform suggest. Rather than upholding the authenticity of the individual, postmodernism announced, via Foucault and Der rida, the death of the subject. In Jameson's (1988: 15) 1962b [1956, 1947] ) demon strated continuity with prewar leftist work. By in sisting on the concept of alienation, Bell commit ted himself to "capitalism" rather than "industrial ism," thus championing epochal transformation and resisting the postwar modernization line. Soon, however, Bell made the transition to real ism, advocating modernism in a more romantically individualist than radical socialist way. 
Neo-Modernism: Dramatic Inflation and Universal Categories
In postmodern theory intellectuals have represent ed to themselves and to society at large their re sponse to the defeat of the heroic utopias of radical social movements, a response that, while recogniz ing defeat, did not give up the cognitive reference to that utopic world. Every idea in postmodern thought is a reflection upon the categories and false aspirations of the traditional collectivist nar rative, and for most postmodernists the distopia of the contemporary world is the semantic result. Yet, while the hopes of Left intellectuals were dashed by the late 1970s, the intellectual imagination of others was rekindled. For when the Left lost, the should not obscure the fact that a typification and idealization is being made. In more empirical and concrete terms, each historical period and each so cial theory under review contained diverse patterns and parts.
Right won and won big. In the 1960s and 1970s, the right was a backlash, reactive movement. By 1980 it had become triumphant and began to initi ate far-reaching changes in Western societies. A fact that has been conveniently overlooked by each of the three intellectual generations we have considered thus far -and most grievously by the postmodernist movement that was historically co terminous with it -is that the victory of the neo liberal Right had, and continues to have, massive political, economic, and ideological repercussions around the globe. The most striking "success" for the Right was, in deed, the defeat of Communism, which was not only a political, military, and economic victory but, as I suggested in the introduction to this essay, a triumph on the level of the historical imagination itself. Certainly there were objective economic ele ments in the bankruptcy of the Soviet Union, in cluding growing technological deficiencies, sinking export proceeds, and the impossibility of finding desperately needed capital funds by switching to a strategy of internal growth (Muller 1992: 139 ). Yet the final economic breakdown had a political cause, for it was the computer-based military ex pansion of America and its NATO allies, when combined with the right-wing inspired technology boycott, that brought the Soviet party dictatorship to its economic and political knees. While the lack of access to documents makes any definitive judg ment decidedly premature, there seems no doubt that these policies were, in fact, among the princi pal strategic goals of the Reagan and Thatcher gov ernments, and that they were achieved with signal effect. What has often been overlooked, however, is that during this same time frame the capitalist market was also reinvigorated, both symbolically and ob-37 This sense of fundamental, boundary-destroying break is clearly exhibited in the recent work of Ken neth Jowitt, which searches for biblical imagery to communicate a sense of how widespread and threat ening is the contemporary genuine intellectual dis orientation: "For nearly half a century, the boundaries of interna tional politics and the identities of its national partic ipants have been directly shaped by the presence of a Leninist regime world centered in the Soviet Union. The Leninist extinction of 1989 poses a fundamental challenge to these boundaries and identities... Boundaries are an essential component of a recog nizable and coherent identity ... The attenuation of or dissolution of boundaries is more often than not a traumatic event -all the more so when boundaries have been organized and understood in highly cate gorical terms ... The Cold war was a "Joshua" peri od, one of dogmatically centralized boundaries and identities. In contrast to the biblical sequence, the Leninist extinction of 1989 has moved the world from a Joshua to a Genesis environment: from one cen trally organized, rigidly bounded, and hysterically concerned with impenetrable boundaries to one in which territorial, ideological, and issue boundaries are attenuated, unclear, and confusing. We now in habit a world that, while not "without form and void," is one in which the major imperatives are the same as in Genesis, "naming and bounding."" Jowitt comparies the world-reshaping impact of the vents of 1989 with those of the Battle of Hastings in 1066.
jectively, in the capitalist West. This transpired not only in Thatcherite England and Reaganite Ameri ca, but perhaps even more dramatically in the more "progressive" and interventionist regimes like France and, subsequently, in countries like Ita ly, Spain, and even more recently, in Scandinavia itself. Not only was there, in other words, the obvi ous and ideologically portentous bankruptcy of most of the world's Communist economies, but there was the marked privatization of nationalized capitalist economies in both authoritariancorporatist and socialist-democratic states. The world-wide recession that followed the longest pe riod of sustained growth in capitalist history does not seem to have dampened the revival of market commitments, as the recent triumph of Clinton's neoliberalism in the United States demonstrates very well. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the intellec tual successors to modernization theory, neoMarxists like Baran and Sweezy (1964) and Mandel (1968) , announced the imminent stagnation of capitalist economies and an inevitably declining rate of profit.38 History has proved them wrong, with far-reaching ideological results (Chirot 1992) . "Rightward" developments on the more specifical ly political plane have been as far-reaching as those on the economic. As I mentioned earlier, during the late 1960s and 1970s it had become ideological ly fashionable, and empirically justifiable, to ac cept political authoritarianism as the price of eco nomic development. In the last decade, however, events on the ground seem to have challenged this 38 One of the little noticed battle grounds of intellectual ideology over the last 30 years has been the "shop ping center," a.k.a. "the mall." Making its appear ance after World War II in the United States, it came to represent for many conservative liberals the con tinuing vitality -contrary to the dire predictions of Marxist thought in the 1930s -of "small business" and the "petit bourgeoisie." Later, neo-Marxists like Mandel devoted a great deal of space to the shopping centers, suggesting that this new form of organiza tion had staved off capitalism's ultimate economic stagnation, describing it as the organizational equiv alent of advertising's "artificial creation" of "false needs." In the 1980s, these same sprawling congeries of mass capitalism, now transformed into upscale but equally plebeian malls, became the object of attack from postmodernists, who saw them not as wily stop gaps to stagnation but as perfect representations of the fragmentation, commercialism, privatism, and retreatism that marked the end of Utopian hope (and possibly of history itself). The most famous example of the latter is Jameson (e.g., 1988) on the Los Ange les Bonaventure Hotel.
view, and a radical reversal of conventional wis dom is now underway. It is not only Communist tyrannies that have opened up since the mid-1980s, but the very Latin American dictatorships that seemed so "objectively necessary" only an intellec tual generation before. Even African dictatorships have recently begun to show signs of vulnerability to this shift in political discourse from authoritari anism to democracy. These developments have created social conditions -and mass public sentiment -that would seem to belie the postmodern intellectuals' coding of con temporary (and future) society as fatalistic, pri vate, particularistic, fragmented, and local. They also would appear to undermine the deflated nar rative frame of postmodernism, which has insisted either on the romance of difference or, more fun damentally, on the idea that contemporary life can only be interpreted in a comic way. And, indeed, if we look closely at recent intellectual discourse, we can observe, in fact, a return to many earlier, mod ernist themes. Because the recent revivals of market and democ racy have occurred on a world-wide scale, and be cause they are categorically abstract and generaliz ing ideas, universalism has once again become a vi able source for social theory. Notions of common ality and institutional convergence have reemerged, and with them the possibilities for intel lectuals to provide meaning in an utopian way.39 It seems, in fact, that we are witnessing the birth of a 39 For example in his recent plea to fellow members of the academic Left -many if not most of whom are now postmodern in their promotion of difference and particularism -Todd Gitlin argues not only that a renewal of the project of universalism is necessary to preserve a viable critical intellectual politics but that such a movement has already begun: "If there is to be a Left in more than a sentimental sense, its position ought to be: This desire for human unity is indispensable. The ways, means, basis, and costs are a subject for disciplined conversation ... Now, alongside the indisputable premise that knowl edge of many kinds is specific to time, place, and in terpretive community, thoughtful critics are placing the equally important premise that there are unities in the human condition and that, indeed, the exis tence of common understandings is the basis of all communication (= making common) across bound aries of language and history and experience. Today, some of the most exciting scholarship entails efforts to incorporate new and old knowledge together in unified narratives. Otherwise there is no escape from solipsism, whose political expression cannot be the base of liberalism or radicalism." (Gitlin 1993 :36-7).
fourth postwar version of myothopeic social thought. "Neo-modernism" (cf. Tiryakian 1991) will serve as a rough-and-ready characterization of this phase of postmodernization theory until a term appears that represents the new spirit of the times in a more imaginative way. In response to economic developments, different groupings of contemporary intellectuals have re inflated the emancipatory narrative of the market, in which they emplot a new past (antimarket soci ety) and a new present/future (market transition, full-blown capitalism) that makes liberation de pendent upon privatization, contracts, monetary inequality, and competition. On one side, a much enlarged and more activist breed of intellectual conservatives has emerged. Although their policy and political concerns have not, as yet, greatly af fected the discourse of general social theory, there are exceptions that indicate the potential is there. James Coleman's massive Foundations o f Social Theory (1989), for example, has a self-consciously heroic cast; it aims to make neo-market, rational choice the basis not only for future theoretical work but for the re-creation of a more responsive, law-abiding, and less degraded social life.40 Much more significant is the fact that within liberal intellectual life, among the older generation of dis illusioned Utopians and the younger intellectual groups as well, a new and positive social theory of markets has reappeared. For many politically en gaged intellectuals, too, this has taken the theoret ical form of the individualistic, quasi-romantic frame of rational choice. Employed initially to deal with the disappointing failures of working class consciousness (e.g., Wright 1985 and Pzeworski 1985; cf. Elster 1989) , it has increasingly served to explain how state communism, and capi talist corporatism, can be transformed into a market-oriented system that is liberating or, at least, substantively rational (Pzeworski 1991, Moene/Wallerstein 1992 , Nee 1989 . While other politically engaged intellectuals have appropriated market ideas in less restrictive and more collectiv ist ways (e.g., Szelenyi 1988 , Friedland/Robertson 1990 , their writings, too, betray an enthusiasm for 40 The massive negative response among contemporary social theorists to Coleman's tome -the review sym posium in Theory and Society (e.g., Alexander 1991) is not an untyptical example -is less an indication that rational choice theory is being massively reject ed than an expression of the fact that neo-modernism is not, at this time, sympathetic to a conservative po litical tilt. This may not be true in the future. market processes that is markedly different from the left-leaning intellectuals of earlier times. Among the intellectual advocates of "market so cialism," there has been a similar change. Kornai, for example, has expressed distinctly fewer reser vations about free markets in his more recent writ ings than in the path-breaking works of the 1970s and 1980s that brought him to fame. This neo-modern revival of market theory is also manifest in the rebirth and redefinition of econom ic sociology. In terms of research program, Granovetter's (1974) earlier celebration of the strengths of the market's "weak ties" has become a domi nant paradigm for studying economic networks (e.g., Powell 1991), one that implicitly rejects postmodern and antimodern pleas for strong ties and local communities. His later argument for the "imbeddedness" (1985) of economic action has transformed (e.g., Granovetter and Swedberg 1992) the image of the market into a social and in teractional relationship that has little resemblance to the deracinated, capitalist exploitator of the past. Similar transformations can be seen in more generalized discourse. Adam Smith has been un dergoing an intellectual rehabilitation (Hall 1986; Heilbroner 1986; Boltanski/Thevenot 1991: 60-84; Boltanski 1993: 38-98 ). Shumpter's "market real ism" has been revived; the individaulism of We ber's marginalist economics has been celebrated (Holton/Turner 1989) ; so has the marketacceptance that permeates Parsons' theoretical work (Turner/Holton 1986 and Holton 1992) . In the political realm, neo-modernism has emerged in an even more powerful way, as a result, no doubt, of the fact that it has been the political revolutions of the last decade that have reintro duced narrative in a truly heroic form and chal lenged the postmodern deflation in the most direct way. The movements away from dictatorship, mo tivated in practice by the most variegated of con cerns, have been articulated mythically as a vast, unfolding "drama of democracy" (Sherwood 1994) , literally as an opening up of the spirit of hu manity. (Alexander/Sherwood 1992) . Similar experiences of exaltation and renewed faith in the moral effica cy of democratic revolution were produced by the social drama that took place in 1989 in Hanamen Square, with its strong ritualistic overtones (Chan 1994) and its classically tragic denouement. It would be astonishing if this reinflation of mass political drama did not manifest itself in equally marked shifts in intellectual theorizing about poli tics. In fact, in a manner that parallels the rise of the "market," there has been the powerful reemergence of theorizing about democracy. Liberal ideas about political life, which emerged in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries and which were displaced by the "social question" of the great in dustrial transformation, seem like contemporary ideas again. Dismissed as historically anachronistic in the anti-and post-modern decades, they have become quite suddenly ä la mode (cf., Alexander 1991). This re-emergence has taken the form of the reviv al of the concept of "civil society," the informal, non-state, and non-economic realm of public and personal life that Tocqueville, for example, de fined as vital to the maintenance of the democratic state. Rising initially from within the intellectual debates that helped spark the social struggles against authoritarianism in Eastern Europe (cf., Arato and Cohen 1992) and Latin American (Ste pan 1985), the term was "secularized" and given more abstract and more universal meaning by American and European intellectuals who were connected with these movements, like Cohen and Arato and Keane (1989ab) . Subsequently, they uti lized the concept to begin theorizing in a manner that sharply demarcated their own "left" theoriz ing from the anti-modernization, anti-formal de mocracy writings of an earlier day. Stimulated by these writers and also by the English translation (1989) of Habermas's early book on the bourgeois public sphere, debates about pluralism, fragmentation, differentiation, and participation have become the new order of the day. Frankfurt theorists, Marxist social historians, and even some post-modernists have become democratic theorists under the sign of the "public sphere" (see, e.g., the essays by Postpone, Ryan, and Eley in Cal houn 1992 and the more recent writings of Held, e.g., 1987) .41 * Communitarian and internalist polit ical philosophers, like Walzer (1991 , have taken up the concept to clarify the universalist yet non-abstract dimensions in their theorizing about the good. For conservative social theorists (e.g., Banfield forthcoming, Wilson forthcoming, and Shils 1991 and forthcoming), civil society is a con cept that implies civility and harmony. For neo functionalists (e.g., Sciulli 1992 , Mayhew 1992 , it is an idea that denotes the possibility of theorizing conflicts over equality and inclusion in a less anticapitalist way. For old functi onalists (e.g., Inkeles 1991), it is an idea that sug gests that formal democracy has been a requisite for modernization all along. But whatever the particular perspective that has framed this new political idea, its neo-modern sta tus is plain to see. Theorizing in this manner sug gests that contemporary societies either possess, or must aspire to, not only an economic market but a distinctive political zone, an institutional field of universal if contested domain (Touraine 1994 ). It provides a common empirical point of referent, which implies a familiar coding of citizen and ene 41 There is clear evidence that this transformation is world-wide in scope. In Quebec, for example, Arnaud Sales, who worked earlier in a strongly Marxist tradition, now insists on a universal relatedness among conflict groups and incorporates the language of "public" and "civil society": "If, in their multiplicity, associations, unions, cor porations, and movements have always defended and represented very diversified opinions, it is prob able that, despite the power of economic and statist systems, the proliferation of groups founded on a tra dition, a way of life, an opinion or a protest has prob ably never been so broad and so divesified as it is at the end of the twentieth century." (Sales 1991: 308) .
my, and allows history to be narrated, once again, in a teleological manner that gives the drama of democracy full force.
Neo-Modernism and Social Evil: Nationalism as Polluted Representation
This problem of the demarcation of civil as op posed to uncivil society points to issues that go be yond the narrating and explanatory frameworks of neo-modern theory that I have described thus far. Romantive and heroic narratives that describe the triumph, or possible triumph, of markets and de mocracies have a reassuringly familiar form. When we turn to the binary coding of this emerging his torical period, however, certain problems arise. Given the resurgence of universalism, of course, one can be confident that what is involved is a specification of the master code, described earlier as the discourse of civil society. Yet, while this al most archetypical symbolization of the requisites and antonyms of democracy establishes general categories, historically specific "social representa tions" (Moscovici 1984 ) must also be developed to articulate the concrete categories of good and evil in a particular time and place. In regard to these secondary elaborations, what strikes one is how difficult it has been to develop a set of binary cate gories that is semantically and socially compelling, a black-versus-white contrast that can function as a successor code to postmodern: modern or, for that matter, to the socialist: capitalist and modern: tra ditional symbolic sets that were established by ear lier intellectual generations, and which by no means have entirely lost their efficacy today.42 To be sure, the symbolization of the good does not present a real problem. Democracy and universal ism are key terms, and their more substantive em bodiments are free market, individualism, and hu man rights. The problem comes in establishing the profane side. The abstract qualities that pollution must embody are obvious enough. Because they are produced by the principle of difference, they closely resemble the qualities that were opposed to modernization in the postwar period, qualities that identified the pollution of "traditional" life. But despite the logical similarities, earlier ideological formulations cannot simply be taken up again. Even if they effectuate themselves only through 42 See my earlier remarks (n. 28, above) on the inertial effects of intellectual ideologies and on the social conditions that exacerbate them.
differences in second order representations, the differences between present day society and the immediate postwar period are enormous. Faced with the rapid onrush of "markets" and "democra cy," and the rapid collapse of their opposites, it has proven difficult to formulate equally universal and far-reaching representations of the profane. The question is this: Is there an oppositional movement or geo-political force that is a convincingly and fundamentally dangerous, that is a "worldhistorical" threat to the "good"? The once power ful enemies of universalism seemed to be historical relics, out of sight and out of mind, laid low by an historical drama that seems unlikely soon to be re versed. It was for this semantic reason that, in the interim period after "1989", many intellectuals, and certainly broad sections of Western publics, experienced a strange combination of optimism and self-satisfaction, energetic commitment and moral disrepair.
In comparison with the modernization theory of the postwar years, neo-modern theory involves fundamental shifts in both symbolic time and sym bolic space. In neo-modern theory, the profane can neither be represented by an evolutionarily preceding period of traditionalism nor identified with the world outside of North America and Eu rope. In contrast with the postwar modernization wave, the current one is global and inter-national rather than regional and imperial, a difference ar ticulated in social science by the contrast between early theories of dependency (Frank 1966) and more contemporary theories of globalization (Robertson 1992) . The social and economic rea sons for this change center on the rise of Japan, which this time around has gained power, not as one of Spencer's military societies -a category that could be labelled backward in an evolutionary sense -but as a civilized commercial society. Thus, for the first time in 500 years (see Kennedy 1987) , it has become impossible for the West to dominate Asia, either economically or culturally. When this objective factor is combined with the pervasive de-Christianization of Western intellec tuals, we can understand the remarkable fact that "orientalism" -the symbolic pollution of Eastern civilization that Said (1978) articulated so tellingly scarcely more than a decade ago -seems no longer to be a forceful spatial or temporal representation in Western ideology or social theory, although it has by no means entirely disappeared.43 A social scientific translation of this ideological fact, which points the way to a post-postmodern, or neo modern code, is Eisenstadt's (1987: vii) call for "a far-reaching reformulation of the vision of mod ernization, and of modem civilizations." While continuing to code modern in a thoroughly posi tive way, this conceptualization explains it, not as the end of an evolutionary sequence, but as a high ly successfully globalizing movement.
Instead of perceiving modernization as the final stage in the fulfillment of the evolutionary potential common to all societies -of which the European experience was the most important and succinct manifestation and para digm -modernization (or modernity) should be viewed as one specific civilization or phenomenon. Originating in Europe, it has spread in its economic, political and ideological aspects all over the world ... The crystalliza tion of this new type of civilization was not unlike the spread of the great religions, or the great imperial ex pansions, but because modernization almost always combined economic, political, and ideological aspects and forces, its impact was by far the greatest, (ibid.)
Original modernization theory transformed We ber's overtly Western-centric theory of world reli gions into a universal account of of global change that still culminated in the social structure and cul ture of the postwar Western world. Eisenstadt pro poses to make modernization itself the historical equivalent of a world religion, which relativizes it, on the one hand, and suggests the possibility of se lective indigenous appropriation (Hannerz 1987 West's actual power in the world -imperialism -that allowed the ideology of orientalism to proceed. What Said does not recognize, however, is that there is a more general code of sacred and profane categories of which the "social representations" of orientalism is an historically specific subset. The discourse of civ il society is an ideological formation that proceeded imperialism and that informed the pollution of di verse categories of historically encountered othersJews, woman, slaves, proletarians, homosexuals, and more generally enemies -in quite similar terms.
justified his opposition not by pointing to the dis tinctive worth of national or political ideology but by upholding universality: "Anew world order has to be based on authentically general principles, not on the selectively applied might of one country" (Said 1991 Wlien Said concludes that there appears to be a "remorseless Arab propensity to violence and ex tremism," the end of occidentalism seems com plete.
Because the contemporary re-coding of the antith esis of universalism can be geographically repre sented neither as non Western nor temporally lo cated in an earlier time, the social sacred of neo modernism cannot, paradoxically, be represented as "modernization." In the ideological discourse of contemporary intellectuals, it would seem almost as difficult to employ this term as it is to identify the good with "socialism." Not modernization but democratization, not the modern but the marketthese are the terms that the new social movements of the neo-modern period employ. The logic of these telling institutional and cultural shifts is that "nationalism" -not traditionalism, communism, or the "East" -is coming to repre sent the principal challenge to the newly universal ized discourse of the good. Nationalism is the name intellectuals and publics are now increasing ly giving to the negative antinomies of civil society.
The categories of the "irrational," "conspiratori al," and "repressive" are taken to be synonymous with forceful expressions of nationality, and equat ed with primordiality and uncivilized social forms. It is the failure to confirm such a semantic and or ganizational analogy with communism that has prevented religious fundamentalism from occupy ing a similar categorically polluting role. It has been unable to do so despite the currency of fundamentalism-versus-modernity in everyday speech (e.g., Barber 1992) and the myriad exam ples of its very real dangers to democracy, markets, and social differentiation that are ready to hand.45 On the one hand, because intellectuals in demo cratic nations are continually criticising the renew al of fundamentalist forms of religiosity in their democratic countries, it is difficult for them to equate secular with democratic or to place funda mentalist religiosity completely outside the pale of democratic life. On the other hand, postcommun ist nations are not particularly fundamentalist; nor has fundamentalism posed the same kind of real politik basis for the renewal of large scale conflict as the militant assertion of national rights. In Winter, 1994, Theory and Society, a bellweather of intellectual currents in Western social theory, devoted a special issue to nationalism. In their in troduction to the symposium, John Comaroff and Paul Stern make particularly vivid the link be tween nationalism-as-pollution and nationalismas-object-of-social-science.
Nowhere have the signs of the quickening of contem porary history, of our misunderstanding and mispredic tion of the present, been more clearly expressed than in the ... assertive renaissance of nationalisms ... World events over the past few years have thrown a particular ly sharp light on the darker, more dangerous sides of na tionalism and claims to sovereign identity. And, in so do ing, they have revealed how tenuous is our grasp of the phenomenon. Not only have these events confounded the unsuspecting world of scholarship. They have also shown a long heritage of social theory and prognostica tion to be flatly wrong. (Comaroff and Stern 1994: 35) While these theorists do not, of course, deconst ruct their empirical argument by explicitly relating it to the rise of a new phase of myth and science, it is noteworthy that they do insist on linking the new understanding of nationalism to the rejection of Marxism, modernization theory, and postmodern thought (ibid., 35-37). In their own contribution to this special revival issue, Greenfeld and Chirot insist on the fundamental antithesis between de mocracy and nationalism in the strongest terms. After discussing Russia, Germany, Roumania, Syr-ia, Iraq, and the Cambodian Khmer Rouge, they write:
The cases we discuss here show that the association be tween certain types of nationalism and aggressive, bru tal behavior is neither coincidental nor inexplicable. Na tionalism remains the world's most powerful, general, and primordial basis of cultural and political identity. Its range is still growing, not diminishing, throughout the world. And in most places, it does not take an individu alistic or civic form. (Greenfeld/Chirot 1994: 123 In 1982 (p. 144), when Anthony Giddens confi dently asserted that "modernization theory is based upon false premises," he was merely reiter ating the common social scientific sense of the day, or at least his generation's version of it. When he added that the theory had "served ... as an ideo logical defence of the dominance of Western capi talism over the rest of the world," he reproduced the common understanding of why this false theo ry had once been believed. Today both these senti ments seem anachronistic. Modernization theory (e.g., Parsons 1963 ) stipulated that the great civili zations of the world would converge towards the institutional and cultural configurations of Western society. Certainly we are witnessing something very much like this process today, and the enthusi asm it has generated is hardly imposed by Western domination. The sweeping ideological and objective transfor mations described in the preceding section have begun to have their theoretical effect, and the the oretical gauntlet that the various strands of neo modernism have thrown at the feet of postmodern theory are plain to see. Shifting historical condi tions have created fertile ground for such postpostmodern theorizing, and intellectuals have re sponded to these conditions by revising their earli er theories in creative and often far-reaching ways. Certainly, it would be premature to call neo modernism a "successor theory" to postmodern ism. It has only recently become crystallized as an intellectual alternative, much less emerged as the 46 In a telling observation on the paradoxical relation ship of nationalism to recent events, Wittrock (1991) notes that when West Germany pressed for re unification, it both affirmed the abstract universalism of notions like freedom, law, and markets and, at the same time, the ideology of nationalism in its most particularistic, ethnic and linguistic sense, the notion that the "German people" could not be divided.
victor in this ideological-cum-theoretical fight. It is unclear, further, whether the movement is nour ished by a new generation of intellectuals or by fragments of currently competing generations who have found in neo-modernism a unifying vehicle to dispute the postmodern hegemony over the con temporary field. Despite these qualifications, how ever, it must be acknowledged that a new and very different current of social theorizing has emerged on the scene. With this success, however, there comes the grave danger of theoretical amnesia about the problems of the past. Retrospective verifications of modern ization theory have begun in earnest. One of the most fulsome and acute apologias appeared re cently in the European Journal o f Sociology. "With an apparently more acute sense of reality, " Muller (1992: 111) writes, "the sociological theory of mo dernity had recorded the long-term developments within the Eastern European area, currently tak ing place in a more condensed form, long before they were empirically verifiable." Muller adds, for good measure, that "the grand theory constantly accused of lacking contact with reality seemingly proves to possess predictive capacity -the classical sociological modernization theory of Talcott Par sons" (ibid., original italics). Distinguished theo rists who were once neo-Marxist critics of capitalist society, like Bryan Turner, have become believers, defending Western citizenship (Turner 1986 ) against radical egalitarianism and lauding Parsons for his "anti-nostalgic" endorsement (Holton/Turner 1986 ) of the basic structures of modern life. Among former Communist apparatchiks them selves, there is growing evidence (i.e., Borko cited in Muller 1992: 112) that similar "retro-dictions" about the convergence of capitalist and communist societies are well underway, tendencies that have caused a growing number of "revisits" to Schum peter as well. The theoretical danger here is that this enthusiastic and long overdue re-appreciation of some of the central thrusts of postwar social science might ac tually lead to the revival of convergence and mod ernization theories in their earlier forms. In his re flections on the recent transitions in Eastern Eu rope, Habermas (1990: 4) employs such evolution ary phrases as "rewinding the reel" and "rectifying revolution. " Inkeles' (1991) recent tractatus to American policy agencies is replete with such con vergence homilies as a political "party should not seek to advance its objectives by extra political means." Sprinkled with advice about "the impor tance of locating ... the distinctive point where ad ditional resources can provide greatest leverage," the article displays the kind of over-confidence in controlled social change that marked the hubris of postwar modernization thought. When Lipset (1990) claims the lesson of the second great transi tion as the failure of the "middle way" between capitalism and socialism, he is no doubt correct in an important sense, but the formulation runs the danger of reinforcing the tendentious, either/or di chotomies of earlier thinking in a manner that could justify not only narrow self-congratulation but unustified optimism about imminent social change. Jeffrey Sachs and other simpliste exposi tors of the "big bang" approach to transition seem to be advocating a rerun of Rostow's earlier "take off" theory. Like that earlier species of moderniza tion idea, this new monetarist modernism throws concerns of social solidarity and citizenship, let alone any sense of historical specificity (Leijonhofvud 1993) , utterly to the winds. While the recent social scientific formulations of market and democracy discussed above avoid the most egregious distortions of the kind I have just described, the universalism of their categories, the heroism of their Zeitgeist, and the dichotomous strictures of their codes make the underlying prob lems difficult to avoid. Theories of market transi tion, even in the careful hands of a scholar as con scientious as Victor Nee, sometimes suggests a lin earity and rationality that historical experience be lies. Civil society theory, despite the extraordinary self-consciousness of philosophers like Cohen and Walzer, seems unable to theorize empirically the demonic, anti-civil forces of cultural life that it normatively proscribes (cf., Sztompka 1991) .
If there is to be a new and more successful effort at constructing a social theory about the fundamen tally shared structures of contemporary societies (cf., Sztompka 1993: 136-41) , it will have to avoid these regressive tendencies, which resurrect mod ernization ideas in their most simplistic forms. In stitutional structures like democracy, law, and mar ket are functional requisites if certain social com petencies are to be achieved and certain resources to be acquired; they are not, however, either his torical inevitabilities or linear outcomes, nor are they social panaceas for the problems of non economic subsystems or groups (see, e.g., Rueschemeyer 1992) . Social and cultural differentiation may be an ideal-typical pattern that can be analyti cally reconstructed over time; however, whether or not any particular differentiation occurs -market, state, law, or science -depends on the normative aspirations (e.g., Sztompka 1991), strategic posi tion, history and powers of particular social groups. No matter how socially progressive in it self, morever, differentiation displaces as much as it resolves, and can create social upheaval on an enormous scale. Social systems may well be plural istic and the causes of change multidimensional; at any given time and in any given place, however, a particular subsystem and the group that directs iteconomic, political, scientific, or religious -may successfully dominate and submerge the others in its name. Globalization is, indeed, a dialectic of indigenization and cosmopolitanism, but cultural and political asymmetries remain between more and less developed regions, even if they are not in herent contradictions of some imperialistic fact. While the analytic concept of civil society must by all means be recovered from the heroic age of dem ocratic revolutions, it should be de-idealized so that "anti-civil society" -the countervailing pro cesses of decivilization, polarization, and violence -can be seen also as typically "modern" results. Finally, these new theories must be pushed to maintain a decentered, self-conscious reflexivity about their ideological dimensions even while they continue in their efforts to create a new explanato ry scientific theory. For only if they become aware of themselves as moral constructions -as codes and as narratives -will they be able to avoid the to talizing conceit that gave early modernizing theory such a bad name. In this sense, "neo-" must incor porate the linguistic turn associated with "post-" modern theory, even while it challenges its ideo logical and more broadly theoretical thrust.
In one of his last and most profound theoretical meditations, Francois Bourricaud (1987: 19-21) suggested that "one way of defining modernity is the way in which we define solidarity." The notion of modernity can be defended, Bourricaud be lieved, if, rather than "identify[ing] solidarity with equivalence," we understand that the "'general spirit' is both universal and particular." Within a group, a generalizing spirit "is universal, since it regulates the intercourse among members of the group." Yet, if one thinks of the relations between nations, this spirit "is also particular, since it helps distinguish one group from all others." In this way, it might be said that "the 'general spirit of a nation' assures the solidarity of individuals, without neces sarily abolishing all their differences, and even es tablishing the full legitimacy of some of them." What of the concept of universalism? Perhaps, Bourricaud suggested, "modem societies are char acterized less by what they have in common or by their structure with regard to well-defined univer sal exigencies, than by the fact of their involve ment in the issue of universalization" as such (ital ics added). Perhaps it is wise to acknowledge that it is a re newed sense of involvement in the project of uni versalism, rather than some lipid sense of its con crete forms, that marks the character of the new age in which we live. Beneath this new layer of the social top soil, moreover, there lies the tangled roots and richly marbled subsoil of earlier intellec tual generations, whose ideologies and theories have not ceased to be alive. The struggles between these interlocutors can be intimidating and confus ing, not only because of the intrinsic difficulty of their message but because each presents itself not as form but as essence, not as the only language in which the world makes sense but as the only real sense of the world. Each of these worlds does make sense, but only in an historically bounded way. Recently, a new social world has come into being. We must try to make sense of it. For the task of intellectuals is not only to explain the world; they must interpret it as well.
